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ABSTRACT: Existing theories on the state and neoliberalism demonstrate that the state 
is resilient enough to restructure itself under neoliberalization of the economy. These 
theories, however, do not explain exactly how and why the state can be resilient. Using 
the case of spatial planning in South Korea around the turn of the millennium, when 
neoliberalism was an apparent consensus and the economy clearly was neoliberalized, 
this paper attempts to demonstrate that the source of the state‟s resilience is the 
heterogeneity of the neoliberal consensus. Neoliberalism, as a geographically and 
historically specific ideology in South Korea, combines political liberalism, economic 
conservatism, resistant regionalism, and localism. This heterogeneity within the 
neoliberal consensus in the ruling block allows the state to interpret neoliberalism in such 
a way that it can maintain a strong hold on its spatial economy by combining various 
spatial planning measures and simultaneously adjusting its spatial economy to accord 
with the neoliberalization of the global economy. 
 





Neoliberalism is, at least in its pure ideological form, among other things, the preference 
for market over state intervention (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005). As such, it was often 
assumed that neoliberalization equals a weakening of the state‟s role in the economy. 
Recent findings, however, show that the state is often an active agent in, rather than a 
helpless victim of, neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 1994). Within the discussion of the 
state‟s spatial dimension, political geographers and political scientists have shown that 
the state actively allocated its earlier rights and duties to local governments. Thus, the 
state‟s restructuring is a change in the spatiality of the statehood, rather than a weakening 
of the state (Brenner, 2004). These authors, however, do not explain exactly why and 
how the state possesses such resilience. 
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Using the South Korean experience in the early 2000s, when neoliberalism was a 
consensus in South Korea, this paper shows that the state can use neoliberal discourse to 
strengthen rather than weaken itself. More specifically, this paper looks at the state‟s 
spatial strategies and show that it could use two opposite strategies, which we call 
containment and diffusion, to better adapt its national economy to globalization while 
simultaneously reinforcing its hold on the spatial economy within its territory. This paper 
further argues that the heterogeneous mix of ideologies within the hegemonic block 
allows the state to combine those ideologies in interpreting a fragile consensus in such a 
way that the state strengthens itself. 
 
Theorizing Neoliberalization and the State 
Mainstream globalization research assumes that the national state‟s power has been 
substantially weakened by the increasing mobility of capital. Globalization theorists 
ascribe the weakening of state power to the telecommunication revolution (Wriston, 
1992) or to the deregulation rally, in which states were forced into competing with one 
another (Cerny, 1995; Sinclair, 1994), or to both (Strange, 1996). (See also Giddens, 
1990; Gray, 1998; Greider, 1997; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Lash and Urry, 1994; 
Swyngedouw, 1997). Thus, such research concludes that neoliberalization is a forced 
response from the national state that dismantles the state itself. If one takes this 
theoretical position, analysis of neither the national state nor its policies would prove very 
useful. If the state‟s actions are determined by global forces, such forces should be the 
focus in state analyses. 
More recently, however, the emerging consensus is that the depiction of the state 
as a helpless victim is, at best, exaggerated. Among the various theoretical strands that 
find that the state plays an active role in the neoliberal global economy, two groups of 
theories are prominent: the Weberian theory of the state and the Marxist theory of the 
state. These alternative theories can describe the resilient nature of the state in the context 
of neoliberal globalization. These theories, however, do not give a full explanation of 
where this resilience comes from. 
Weberian Approaches 
Linda Weiss and Robert Wade argue that globalization theory is an exaggeration of 
reality. According to them, globalization theorists overestimate the capacity of the state 
from earlier times and underestimate the capacity of the state in current times. In reality, 
the state has always had trouble controlling international finance, even before the 20th 
century. Many nation-states, particularly those in East Asia, have been successful in 
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adapting to, and even coordinating, the globalization of capital (Weiss, 1998; Wade, 
1996). 
Linda Weiss attempts to overcome what she calls the “globalization theory,” 
which regards the state as a mere victim of the global economy. She seems to develop 
interlinked but separate explanations of the state‟s livelihood on two spatial scales. On a 
global scale, she argues that the relationship between state sovereignty and global 
economic integration is not a zero sum game but rather a mutual reinforcement. Because 
the nation-states are “important drivers” and “normative and organizational supports” for 
globalization, contemporary globalization is a national process as much as it is a global 
process (Weiss, 2005: 352). 
On a national scale, Weiss demonstrates through East Asian cases that the state 
still possesses great leverage in controlling international financial flow. She does 
acknowledge that globalization creates constraints for some policy areas, but she also 
emphasizes that there is “ample room for action in key policy areas” (Weiss, 2005: 345). 
Because mobility is increased, the state incentives “take initiatives that will strengthen the 
national system of innovation and social protection” (Weiss, 2003:15). Based on this 
reasoning, she claims that globalization has an “enabling face” or “augmenting effects”, 
as well as a constraining aspect. 
The merit of Weiss‟s approach is that, according to her framework, financial 
neoliberalization can coexist with a strengthening of the welfare regime. Because she sees 
the “enabling face” as coexistent with global constraints, she can ascribe contradictory 
factors to one or the other. Furthermore, her approach helps us recognize that the state is 
an active participant, a gatekeeper, and a filtering agent, rather than a mere victim, of the 
neoliberalization process. 
However, the weakness in her framework is that the realization of the “enabling 
face” is completely dependent on the choices of elites choice. She accepts that the 
“enabling face” exists only potentially and thus that its realization is dependent on 
historical contingencies. She explains why the state needs to play more important roles 
under globalization, but falls short of elaborating upon whether the state can or will. 
She cites Peter Katzenstein‟s (1985) case studies and claims, 
The greater the level of (trade) interdependence, the stronger the elite perception 
of vulnerability, and the greater the likelihood of compensatory and inclusionary 
domestic structures which blunt rather than exacerbate the pressure of openness (p. 
14). 
However, this is again only a description of the need. It is still not clear whether 
the elites will respond to the needs of the people. She seems to attempt to argue that 
globalization‟s “enabling face” is realized when there is enough of a “voice” from the 
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people (Weiss, 2005: 347), but she stops there. She does not explain under what 
circumstances the “voice” can get stronger, and under which circumstances the state will 
respond to that “voice.” The “voice” does not automatically arise even if the oppressed 
class needs it to express their frustrations. This is because there are elaborate mechanisms 
in place to tame the voices of the oppressed, as considered in the Gramscian discussion 
on hegemony and the more recent Foucauldian discussion on governmentality (Sonn and 
Gimm, 2013). Furthermore, even if people actually raise their voices, the elites do not 
necessarily respond. In fact, labor is less mobile than capital, so elites may want to take 
the exit of capital more seriously than the voice of the people. 
Marxist Approaches 
Like Weberians, those who are related to regulation theory in its wider definition  argue 
that the state‟s incompetence is exaggerated. Regulationists accept that globalization 
creates constraints on the state‟s capacity to manage its economy: 
The growing internationalization of capital accompanying the final stages of 
Fordism transformed the situation: wages were increasingly seen primarily as a 
cost of production and only secondarily as a source of national demand. This 
holds for both individual wages and the social wage. This threatened the national 
institutionalized class compromise between organized labour and domestic 
industrial capital and, in conjunction with the inversion of the primary and 
secondary aspects of the money form, tends to shift the balance of power in this 
compromise from organized labour to productive capital (Jessop, 2002: 105). 
As a result, the state is now labeled a Schumpeterian competition state, which, among 
other things, “chang[es] regulatory frameworks to facilitate labor-market flexibility and 
mobility within the national economic space,” “engag[es] in complementary forms of 
Standortpolitik and other forms of place-based competition in an attempt to fix mobile 
capital within the state‟s own economic spaces and to enhance the interurban, 
interregional or international competitiveness of its own place-bound capitals” (p. 138), 
and “socializ[es] long-term conditions of production as short-term calculation becomes 
more dominant in marketized economic activities” (p. 139). 
However, the acceptance of an increasingly difficult situation for the state does 
not equate to the admission of the state‟s total incompetence. As Weiss does, Jessop 
claims that the state still has substantial power to influence its domestic political economy 
and its inbound and outbound flow of capital, despite the increasing transnational 
mobility of capital.  
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Localization is often regarded as the self-dissolution of the nation-state. Jessop 
accepts that the scale of the national state is currently going through a “hollowing out” of 
sovereignty, giving out part of its sovereignty to transitional and local political units. 
However, Jessop, Brenner, and Jones see this hollowing out as the nation-state‟s choice 
rather than a forced response. 
The state has strategic selectivity in place that favors certain economic sectors 
over others (Jessop, 1992). Geographically, the state strategically selects the scale of the 
city rather than the scale of the national state as a proactive strategy in accommodating, 
facilitating, and even promoting globalization (Jones, 1999). 
State spatial restructuring is best viewed as a layering process in which newly 
emergent state spatial projects and state spatial strategies interact with the 
inherited configuration of state space. This interaction generates new, multi-
layered formations of state spatiality that eclectically combine elements of 
inherited state spatial arrangements with newly forged regulatory geographies 
(Brenner, 2004, p. 192). 
Therefore, “neoliberalism must be viewed as a concerted political strategy 
through which qualitatively new forms of state-economy relations have been constructed, 
at various spatial scales,” (Brenner, 2004: 200) for the elimination of the post-war welfare 
regime that is now viewed as a cost that only hinders international competitiveness, rather 
than as a source for domestic demand. Again, like Weberians, the Marxist approach does 
not explain from where this resilience of the state comes. 
 
Heterogeneous Strategies in Neoliberal Spatial Policies in South Korea 
Since its democratization, which proceeded gradually between 1987 and 1997, 
South Korea‟s public policy has shown two distinctive features. In diverse areas of 
economic policy, the current South Korean state can be called neoliberal, without much 
opposition: The financial market very quickly opened up to the international flow of 
capital. In late 2005, the share of foreigners in the stock market in terms of total market 
value was 40.5%, versus only 14.6% in late 1997.
1
 The share of foreign banks grew 
fivefold, and the share of foreign insurance companies in life insurance grew by a factor 
of 16 since the 1997 economic crisis.
2
 These are the results of policies by the Kim Dae 
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 ETNEWS 2005, December 12, www.etnews.co.kr/news/detail.html?id=200512120033 
(Accessed February 19, 2006). 
2
 Hankyoreh 2005, December 26, www.hani.co.kr/kisa/section-
003001000/2005/12/003001000200512261833457.html (Accessed February 19, 2006). 
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Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations. In the labor market evidence of neoliberalism 
is even clearer. In August 2004, 59.6% of workers were in contingent employment of one 
form or another, leaving behind the legend of lifetime employment under the 
developmental state. In this regard, it is safe to say that South Korea‟s financial and labor 
policies since the 1997 economic crisis have been governed by a neoliberal ideology.
3
 
Under the dominance of neoliberalism, however, state intervention in spatial 
planning did not decrease. What is more interesting than the quantity of the state 
intervention is the contradiction between its content and the delivery mechanism. As 
shown in the following sections, the content of spatial planning during these two 
administrations was, to a considerable degree, neoliberal. However, this content was 
combined with the traditional administrative mechanism of strong central government 
intervention. The state combines different spatial strategies for different policy contents 
so that it does not lose its control over economic activities within its territory. Two 
examples in which opposite spatial strategies were used are covered below; I call these 
strategies “containment” and “diffusion”, respectively. Containment strategy is an 
approach whereby the neoliberal content of spatial policy is contained within the 
boundary set by the state. By contrast, diffusion strategy is an approach designed to 
spread neoliberal content to the entire territory. 
The Incheon Free-Economic Zone: Containment Strategy 
The containment strategy of neoliberal spatial policy is evident in the 
development of the Incheon Free Economic Zone, which is a full-fledged neoliberal 
space created by the national state. The Incheon Free Economic Zone is composed of  
three districts (Songdo, Cheongna, and Yeongjong) in 209 square kilometers, an area 
slightly bigger than Monaco. When development is completed as planned in 2020, the 
area will have 480,000 residents. The total public budget for infrastructure is $15 billion 
(Incheon City Government and Ministries of the Knowledge Economy, 2007). 
                                                 
3
 In other areas, however, policies that are not compatible with, or sometimes contradictory to, 
neoliberalism can be found easily. One of the prominent examples is the government‟s welfare 
expenditure. The central government‟s welfare budget more than doubled in eight years, jumping 
from 0.8% of the GDP in 1997 to 1.7% in 2005 (Choi, 2005); 1.7% is less than half of the OECD 
average, but as South Korea‟s population ages, the number of recipients of retirement benefits 
will grow, and the welfare budget to GDP ratio should approach the European level in 20 years, 
without introducing any new benefits. This fast growth, which is difficult to find in advanced 
capitalist countries, led some of the authors to conclude that South Korea‟s welfare regime is 
approaching the continental European model of social welfare (Kim, YM, p. 356). While there 
are debates about the nature of the welfare expenditure, the emerging consensus among experts 
on South Korean social policy is that this welfare growth is not explained by the trend of 
neoliberalization the South Korean state is following. 
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The origin of the plan can be found within the local government. In the late 1980s, 
there were attempts among local government officials, with support from the local 
business community, to formulate ideas about the transformation of Incheon‟s economy 
from manufacturing to high-tech (Park, YS, 2008: 20–24). However, the local climate for 
this project quickly changed after President Roh Tae Woo (1988–1992) was elected. He 
promised, as a presidential candidate, to build 2,000,000 houses to ease the housing 
shortage nationwide, especially in the capital region. The business hub proponents within 
the Incheon government thought they could make a “superficial” change to the project by 
adding a little more housing and by packaging the whole project as a part of the 
president‟s housing policy. That way they could receive support from the central 
government. Now the project is called “Songdo New Town.” The national government 
supported the project because Incheon is only 15 kilometers away from Seoul, where the 
housing shortage was not severe. 
However, this “superficial” change created a more fundamental alteration to the 
project than originally intended. After housing became a more explicit part of the project, 
the majority of local elites, who up until that point had been quiet about the project, 
began to argue that housing is a better way for the development of Songdo to achieve 
success (Sonn, Shin, and Park, 2015). 
During this period of confusion, South Korea was hit by the East Asian Economic 
Crisis in 1997. This national crisis gave Songdo national importance. The discourse about 
a free-economic zone (hereafter referred to as a “FEZ”) had existed within the central 
government, but after the economic crisis hit it suddenly became a concrete policy 
agenda item. During the crisis, national competitiveness occupied the central position in 
policy discourse among academic and policy circles. Within that discourse, hosting 
multinational firms was regarded as the defining factor of national competitiveness. 
Under the sway of this discourse, it seemed only natural that Songdo would serve as a 
national project. 
It was also natural that the discourse of deregulation would revolve around the 
labor, technology, industrial, and environmental policy areas. In such a discursive 
landscape, the regional balance policy that was curbing the growth of the capital region 
was seen as an obstacle to national economic growth because the capital region is the 
most competitive region in the country. As such, creating a free-economic zone in 
Incheon, which is within the capital region, was now an acceptable policy measure. 
As Kim (2007) rightly pointed out, this project is being designed and 
implemented by the national state. The implementation of the project is maintained by the 
Committee for an Economic Special Zone under the central government‟s minister of 
finance and economy, according to the Law for Designation and Management of a Free 
Economic Zone. 
President Kim Dae Jung announced the “Strategy for a Business Hub of Northeast 
Asia” in his New Year‟s Speech in 2002 (January 14, 2002). Under this plan and 
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subsequent policy measures, Songdo as a FEZ would be a full-fledged neoliberal space 
plugged into the global circuit of capital. Later in that same year, the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy announced its strategic master plan, of which FEZ was an important part. 
Under this master plan, a business-friendly and residential environment suitable for 
highly skilled, highly paid foreign employees would have been provided. English would 
become an official language along with Korean, and the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen 
would be official currencies along with the Korean won. The FEZ Authority would be set 
up and would provide a “one-stop service” for taxes, financing, and employment issues 
for investors (Shin, Sonn, and Park, forthcoming). 
The dominance of the national state is reflected in the words of Stan Gale, the 
president of Gale Company: 
We were invited in by the central government of Korea. … The central 
government of Korea views this as a national project, and they teamed us up with 
Korea‟s leading corporation, Posco Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. … We 
were able to get government buy-back guarantees on the land and all kinds of 
insurance (Wood, 2004, quoted in Kim (2007): 205–206, footnote 51). 
The national state has created laws and other institutions for only this zone. The 
Law for the Designation and Management of a Free Economic Zone covers all FEZs, but 
it is intended mainly for the Incheon FEZ. In the Songdo FEZ, firms enjoy cuts in 
national and local taxes. The local governments are allowed to provide aid for the 
collective consumption of goods such as education, health care, housing, among others. It 
was also planned that all government documents would be published in English (Kim, 
2007: 202). As has been made evident there, the project is certainly receiving special 
treatment from the national states. In that sense, the nation state‟s strategy is a spatially 
differentiating one (Ong, 2000). 
The neoliberal contents of a free economic zone would certainly undermine the 
state‟s control of economic activity within that zone, thereby challenging the state‟s 
sovereignty. This is why the full-fledged neoliberalist practice had to be contained within 
the zone. At the time of the national economic crisis, foreign investment was necessary 
for economic and ideological reasons. An important cause of the crisis was the flight of 
foreign investment, so the state intended to bring such investment back. Foreign capital 
before the crisis was in the form of loans to Korean banks, so the state wanted direct 
investment. For that, a free economic zone could be useful. Foreign capital was also 
necessary for political reasons. Newly-elected Kim Dae Jung, who had been the leader of 
an anti-authoritarian movement, had to prove that he could competently handle the 
economy, and bringing in foreign capital would serve that purpose. However, a complete 
opening of the territory would cause the state to lose its control over economic activities, 
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so the opening had to be spatially contained, and a free economic zone would serve that 
purpose. 
Regional Balance Policy: Diffusion Strategy 
The Roh Administration attempted to disperse economic activities to less developed parts 
of the country, but many of these earmarked funds were conditional upon the local 
governments‟ actions toward technological innovation and administrative reforms. The 
neoliberal character of the Roh Administration‟s regional balance reveals itself with the 
concept of “independent localization.” 
Independent localization is a strategy to enhance localities‟ creativity, 
proactiveness and dynamics based on devolution and self-determinacy. At the 
same time, it is [the Roh Administration‟s] main strategy for spatially-balanced 
development that aims at simultaneously achieving both regional development 
and national development (Nam, 2008): 44). … Independent localization is a shift 
of paradigm because it is an attempt to eradicate the old strategy of localization, 
which was [the local government‟s] competition in receiving the central 
government‟s aid. Independent localization promotes the development of a 
regional innovation system through networking among industry, education and 
research communities and pursues endogenous regional development through a 
regional innovation system (Nam, 2008: 45). 
Funding from “Chiyok Hyoksin Saop Gaejong” (the Regional Innovation Projects 
Account) aimed to improve localities‟ growth-potential based on endogenous resources 
(Nam, 2008: 46). The requirements of this fund also resembled the descriptions of 
successful regional innovation systems. Organization of a “Regional Innovation 
Committee” was the first requirement, whereby local leaders of the business community, 
civil society, and academia should discuss an innovation-led local development strategy. 
In addition, to strengthen networks among industry, university, and public research 
institutes, the administration encouraged local research universities, local industry-
university partnerships, and joint ventures among local industry, university, and public 
research institutes through the Connect Korea project (Nam, 2008: 115).
4
 
                                                 
4
 However, the neoliberal character of the Roh Administration‟s spatial policies should not be 
overstated. Like any other policies, the Roh Administration‟s spatial policies are constructed 
through political processes and do not directly reflect a pure ideology. Among the spatial 
strategies that the Roh Administration deployed, some are categorized as “Cohesion Policies” as 
stipulated by “Chiyok Gaebal Saop Gaejong (the Regional Development Project Account).” 
Under this project account, the national state‟s aid was given to underdeveloped regions and rural 
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The main difference between the Roh Administration and previous 
administrations is not the total amount of expenditure on regional balance, which, in the 
forms of the local share of tax collection and central government‟s budget transfer and 
aid to the local, has been an increasing part of the national state‟s budget for quite some 
time. Rather, it is the requirements that the Roh Administration imposed on localities 
(Nam, 2008: 68). 
The Five-Year Plan for Innovative Regional Development was another 
requirement that was imposed. By writing and implementing this plan, the local 
government became the main coordinator of universities and research institutes within its 
locality, although the allocation of R&D expenditures still comes from the central 
government. 
It is noticeable that the innovative regional strategy is always backed up by the 
central government‟s support. R&D expenditure and expenditure to local universities 
from the central government also increased under the NURI project. Other projects that 
involve the central government‟s support include Techno Park, the business incubator, 
the local IT center, and the local science park (Nam, 2008: 109). 
There is a clear contradiction between the neoliberal contents of regional policies 
and the way those contents were delivered. While the policies‟ emphasis was on 
endogenous growth and the denial of paternalistic support for underdeveloped regions, 
the national state had strong control over those policies, using a strategy of carrots and 
sticks on local governments. The contents show that the national state succumbed to the 
neoliberal consensus both within and outside the country, but the delivery mechanism 
shows that the state tried not to lose control over its local governments. Rather than the 
spatial restructuring of statehood as occurred in West European countries, the South 
Korean state reconfirmed its original spatial configuration of state power by delivering 
the same contents that were combined with devolution in Western European countries. 
 
Neoliberalism as the Consensus among Heterogeneous Groups 
We claim that the combination of different strategies linking neoliberal ideology and the 
maintenance of a strong state was possible because of the heterogeneous character of the 
ruling block. That heterogeneity allowed the state to selectively utilize various 
interpretations of neoliberalism. In this section, we explore the heterogeneity of the ruling 
block. 
In a Western context, “individual freedom” is a magic phrase used to justify 
neoliberalism. On the other hand, in South Korea, “democracy” has been the magic word. 
                                                                                                                                                 
areas. The state, however, warns that “cohesion policies” should be used with caution because too 
many will make localities dependent on the national state (Nam, 2008: 46). 
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Because Hayek‟s concept of “freedom” encompasses many potentially contradictory 
factors, the factors included in the Korean concept of “democracy” are contradictory as 
well. 
The two recent administrations‟ main legitimating discourse was democratization. 
While the current administration emphasizes “reform” instead of democratization, this 
change was mainly rhetorical: The current administration and its supporters use “reform” 
as opposed to “reactionary,” which is how they refer to the opposition party, whose 
members are the political descendants of the former authoritarian regimes. Replacing 
“democratization” with “reform” was necessary because, after 40 plus years of use since 
it first appeared in 1960, “democratization” had become almost trite, as the slogan of the 
2002 presidential election. 
In that sense, it is possible to say that “democratization” has been the magic word 
for the two recent administrations. Naturally, the concept that often appears in the 
legitimization strategy of these two administrations‟ policies is “democratization.” By 
analyzing different uses of “democracy” and the political and intellectual origins of those 
uses, the contradictions that exist among the various policy areas of the two most recent 
administrations can be understood. 
 
Political Conservatism 
Because General Park Jung Hee took power via a military coup on May 16, 1961, the 
political leaders from the previous administration formed one of the main political 
resistance groups. Yoon Bo Sun, the president during the Second Republic (1960–1961), 
which was demolished by Park‟s coup, became the leader of the opposition party. 
This group of politicians was by no means progressive. The group‟s political 
lineage included descendants of the Kim Sung Soo and Ho Nam elites, who found 
political support from the agricultural landlord class in the Japanese colonial period of the 
First Republic (1948–1960). This group collaborated with the Japanese colonial 
government and was the governing party at the beginning of the First Republic until the 
alliance with President Lee broke because of his diverse attempts to monopolize power. 
The group‟s political orientation was not very different from that of President Lee, and 
thus Korean political scientists believe the group was forced into the democratization 
movement. Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyon, the presidents of the two most recent 




Economic liberalism became an important part of the democratization movement because 
of President Park‟s strong interventionism. As is widely discussed in the literature on the 
developmental state, the South Korean economy under the Park Administration was 
characterized as a governed economy (Wade, 2004). Private companies were under the 
state‟s control through the carrot of low-interest loans and the stick of political pressure 
(Amsden, 1989). 
Economic liberals criticized Park‟s system as Kwanchi Kyongje, meaning “a 
government-governed economy.” Economic liberals fought against Kwanchi Kyongje 
both inside and outside the state. Inside the state, U.S.-educated bureaucrats who 
occupied important positions after the 1980s were the driving force. Kim Jae Ik, who was 
the senior secretary to the president and had the informal title of presidential economics 
tutor between 1980–1983, received his Ph.D. from Stanford‟s economics department and 
had worked for the Bank of Korea, Korea‟s central bank. His successor, Sakong Il, 
received his Ph.D. degree from the University of California, Los Angeles, which is 
sometimes mocked as the University of “Chicago” at Los Angeles, and taught finance at 
New York University. These were two of the earliest economic liberals in the 
bureaucracy, and they began dismantling Kwanchi Kyongje from the inside. While they 
did not go to the University of Chicago themselves, their research and experience in 
finance gave them an affinity for the Chicago school of economics.  
In civil society, critics of government-led development advocated for a liberal 
market. After the state launched liberalization programs under the auspices of liberal 
bureaucrats, civil society and academic critics focused their attention on the chaebol 
system. The Park Jung Hee Administration chose some of the big firms from national 
champion industries. The administration gave them political loans with low-interest rates 
and other unorthodox incentives. Those big firms had peculiar governance. The founder 
and his family made important strategic decisions without holding the majority of stock, 
which was possible because the cross-holding of stock between companies kept the 
majority of stock under the founding family‟s control. Therefore, the other stockholders, 
whose stock-holding amounted in total to more than the majority, could not have their 
voice be reflected in the companies‟ strategies. Furthermore, founding families, using 
their dominance in the companies, often refused dividends. For those who believed in a 
liberal market economy in which stockholders‟ rights are considered supreme, the 
chaebol system was unacceptable. 
The most influential critic of the chaebol system was the People‟s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD), an NGO that touches on diverse aspects of politics and 
civil society. Similar tendencies are found in many schools of social scientists, including 
that of Byun Hyung Yoon and his former students. 
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The Chaebols themselves were against some aspects of the developmental state. 
The Federation of Korean Industries, which is the association of chaebols and other big 
businesses, set up a research institute called the Centre for Free Enterprise in 1996. The 
aim of this center, as announced on its web page, clearly demonstrates its liberal 
economic ideas. 
When freedom of economic activity is granted, when the attitude that we intend to 
depend on the intervention of the government to solve all problems is discarded, 
and when citizens stop demanding that the government give them this and that, 
Korea then will be able to have strong competitiveness (Centre for Free 
Enterprise). 
Chaebols had been arguing for more of a free market and less of Kwanchi 
Kyongje since the 1970s and finally created this research institute to represent this 
position. The chaebols‟ struggle was sometimes expressed in the form of political 
resistance, such as when Chong Joo-Yong, the founder of Hyun-Dae chaebol, ran for the 
presidency in 1992. 
Resistant Regionalism 
Popular support for the resistance was found in the Ho Nam region. In many ways, this 
support was created by Park, who discriminated against Ho Nam. As explained in Sonn 
(2007), in the 1970s, economic development planning was spatially uneven. Given that 
financial and human resources were scarce, it was probably necessary to concentrate 
those resources on a small number of cities and regions for faster economic growth. 
However, this strategy created a “cumulative causation effect,” and the gap between the 
developed part of the country (i.e., developed cities in Yongnam and Seoul) and the 
undeveloped part (i.e., the rest of the country) continued to grow. 
Park‟s strategy for spatially uneven economic development went along with 
political regionalism. There is no evidence that Park and the ruling elites intended to 
connect these concepts, but the two were realized almost simultaneously, and they 
reinforced each other. As Sonn (2007) explains, spatially uneven economic development 
obviously excludes many regions from the fruits of growth, so the state is likely to lose 
support from those regions. That loss has to be compensated for by stronger support from 
the regions that do enjoy the fruits of development. The Yongnam region increasingly 
supported Park starting in the early 1970s, thus he was able to continue ruling the country 
despite decreasing support from Ho Nam. 
Against this, Ho Nam was not well-mobilized, politically. The most organized 
group during Japanese colonial times was the elites from Ho Nam. These right-wing 
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moderate nationalists became part of the ruling elite at the beginning of modern Korea 
following its liberation in 1945. However, starting in 1950, they were gradually excluded 
from power by President Lee, who wanted to monopolize it. By the beginning of the 
1970s, they were a minority group and called “the Old Sect” within the opposition party. 
Moreover, they did not see themselves as regional representatives. A charismatic young 
leader named Kim Dae Jung emerged from the region, but he did not belong to the Old 
Sect. However, as a presidential candidate in the 1972 election, Park mobilized Yongnam 
by framing the election as a competition between Ho Nam and Yongnam. Ho Nam 
gradually responded by identifying itself with the opposition party. This is most likely the 
point when resistant regionalism began. 
In 1980, resistant regionalism consolidated when the military elites who took 
power in 1979 violently suppressed resistance in Gwangju, the largest city in the Ho Nam 
region. Witnessing students and other demonstrators killed by the military assault that 
was ordered by the political elites from Yongnam, residents of Ho Nam confirmed that 
democracy equated to reinstating Ho Nam as a region on par with Yongnam. This 
resulted in exclusive voting for Ho Nam candidates in the subsequent elections. 
Resistant regionalism finally took effect when Kim Dae Jung won the 
presidential election. His victory stemmed partially from there being two major 
conservative candidates, while Kim was the only liberal candidate. Roh Moo Hyun, the 
next president, continued Kim‟s legacy. He was a Yongnam victim of oppressive 
regionalism. His political base was Busan, within Yongnam, but because he was against 
the leaders of the region he was penalized by voters, who failed him in elections. 
However, from that failure arose the image of Roh as a resistant regionalist, and he 
gained the support of Ho Nam as a result. Combined with support from liberals within 
Yongnam, he won the presidential election in 2002. 
Localism 
In modern Korean history, localism was seldom pronounced as a separate line of 
ideology. Instead, it was always assumed that localization was part of democratization. 
This was because local autonomy was substantially relinquished under President Park. In 
the Second Republic, there was relatively well-institutionalized local autonomy. However, 
this changed after Park‟s capture of power in 1959. He removed all forms of local 
elections, abolished provincial and local councils, and appointed heads of local 
government. Local elections were revived only after 1991, toward the end of the 
authoritarian regime. 
Furthermore, the majority of taxes were collected by the central government, and 
thus the local governments did not have enough financial resources at their disposal to 
carry out their own economic strategies. This did not change much even after the revival 
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of local elections. Therefore, it is safe to say that the autonomy of local governments in 
South Korea has always been limited. 
The relationship between democracy and local autonomy is not theoretically 
evident. On the one hand, bringing decision-making nearer to the people is democratic. 
On the other hand, if localities have extreme autonomy and the central government lacks 
sufficient resources, there will be an increasing gap between economically competitive 
localities and less competitive ones. Yet, in the South Korean public sphere, localization 
has almost always been regarded as part of democratization. This was because of 
President Park‟s centralism, which allowed no room for local autonomy. 
Furthermore, based on its unbalanced growth strategy, the Park Administration 
invested more into developed Yongnam than into underdeveloped regions. As a result, 
people began to regard that central government as the creator of regional imbalance rather 
than its solution. Under these circumstances, it seemed natural that devolution would 
bring more balanced development. 
The two liberal administrations, and especially the Roh Administration, put a 
strong emphasis on localism. Although that emphasis dwindled toward the end of the Roh 
administration, it is clear that he and his aids gave abundant lip service to devolution 
(Sonn, 2007). 
Political Left 
While a consensus was forming between conservatives and liberals, the leftist position 
weakened. This was because leftists allied with liberals in the urgency of democratization, 
and as a result of the relative weakness of their position, these leftists ended up being 
absorbed by liberal parties and political organizations. This absorption has a long history. 
The Second Republic, before General Park‟s coup, was corrupt and incapable of 
either carrying out economic development or running a democracy. Therefore, with 
respect to the military coup, the leftists thought that even if Park‟s methods were 
undemocratic in the procedural sense, they might be a better alternative to a democratic 
government. Prominent leftists, including Chang Joon Ha, supported Park for this reason. 
Later on, however, when it became evident that Park‟s real intention was to hold power 
for a long time, leftists joined the democratization movement led by political 
conservatives. From the 1960s to the 1980s, leftists were offering bipanjokjiji, or 
“support without agreement”, to Kim Dae Jung and other political conservatives. In the 
1971 and 1987 presidential elections, progressive candidates withdrew from the race to 
support Kim Dae Jung in defeating authoritarian leaders. It was very common for student 
activists with leftist leanings to volunteer to help conservative candidates in the general 
elections. Furthermore, many leftists joined conservative parties, partly for their 
individual career interests and partly for their alliance with conservative parties against 
the authoritarian administration.  
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A similar tendency is found within academia. For example, there is Park Hyun 
Che‟s concept of Chonmin Jabonjooeu, which is based on Max Weber‟s concept of 
Pariah Capitalism. According to Weber, Pariah Capitalism is “politically and 
speculatively oriented adventurous capitalism”, as opposed to “the rational organization 
of capital and labor.” While the South Korean economy under Park‟s developmental state 
was similar to Pariah Capitalism in Weber‟s terms, the use of this concept tells us more. 
If the developmental state was a problem because of its similarity to Pariah Capitalism, 
“normal” capitalism should be the ideal form of the economy. Park Hyun Che was a 
socialist intellectual who participated in guerrilla warfare against the South Korean 
government in the 1950s. If he was loyal to socialist ideas, he would have criticized 
capitalism itself rather than Pariah Capitalism, but he chose to criticize the latter, and that 
was a symptom of the fusion of his ideas with economic liberalism. That concept was 
used widely among liberal and leftist social scientists in their criticism of the 
authoritarian regime. 
 
Theoretical Interpretation of Findings  
The state is not completely confined by either historical trajectory (weakening of the state 
by democratization and growth of capital, in this case) or an international context 
(neoliberalization and devolution). While it complies with the neoliberal process, the state 
attempts to preserve itself by differentiating its neoliberalization from that of its Western 
European counterparts. In the case of both Songdo and regional balance policy, the state 
finds a way to at least partly enhance its influence over localities. In Songdo‟s case, the 
national state directly manages to create a neoliberal space. In the case of regional 
balance policy, the state disciplines local governments, holding them responsible for the 
neoliberalization of their territories, but increases its financial leverage to influence the 
process. 
Traditionally, the main objective of a national state‟s territorial policy has been to 
reduce economic and social gaps among regions. This is why political economists 
thought of territorial planning as a part of the state‟s welfare or legitimization function, 
rather than as a part of a production or accumulation function (O'Connor, 1973). This 
paper finds evidence that in South Korea, the national state was the driving force behind 
neoliberal spatial policies, the consequence of which is a neoliberal disciplining of 
localities. A more general implication of this finding is that there is no clear-cut boundary 
between the various functions of the state. As a result, a policy that usually belongs to the 
welfare function can be used as part of the growth function. This requires a noble 
combination of legitimization discourse and actual policy content. In the case of South 
Korea‟s regional balance policy, the state used Keynesian welfare discourse, but the 
actual policy contents were neoliberal. 
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The findings of this paper show that the state‟s neoliberal spatial strategy is not 
homogeneous. Rather, it is differentiated according to the target locality. In Incheon‟s 
case, where attractive locational characters are located, the state directly creates a space 
for neoliberalism in the form of a special economic zone. This approach is similar to that 
of neoliberal urban policies in Western Europe. However, for less favorable localities, the 
state‟s approach has been disciplinary. 
In spatially differentiated spatial planning, the construction of enclaves is an 
effective measure. By linking enclaves with different spatial strategies, the state can 
maintain its hold on the territorial economy without contradicting neoliberal ideology. In 
the South Korean case, the construction of enclaves can be for either the diffusion of 
neoliberalism or the containment of it. 
A large part of regional balance policy has been environmental projects, such as 
the construction of an innovation city and an enterprise city in localities where 
neoliberalism cannot prevail. However, the purpose of the creation of these neoliberal 
enclaves was not to contain neoliberalism, but rather to diffuse it. In the construction of 
these neoliberal cities, the national state imposed conditions that had a disciplinary effect 
on local states. 
The findings of this research show that neoliberalization is not a smooth process, 
even within the state. The South Korean state attempts to discipline local governments 
that do not necessarily have an interest in neoliberalization. From the point of view of 
local governments, receiving aid from the central government would be easier and more 
guaranteed than pursuing a neoliberal strategy, such as promoting innovation and 
attracting investment. However, the national government, whose main legitimization 
discourse is growth not welfare, is not likely to allow local governments to continually 
draw from resources that could be used for projects that directly benefit growth. Behind 
this interscalar conflict is a wider social conflict among socially and spatially divided 
groups of people and organizations. Those that would likely take the neoliberalizing 
state‟s side include large firms that would mostly benefit from the neoliberalization of 
localities. At the same time, a cross-class consensus exists in Seoul that is against state 
aid for other provinces. 
The corollary of all this is that the state‟s spatial process, including but not 
limited to spatial neoliberalization, is not a smooth functional process that a structural 
understanding of state space would be able to predict. The interests of diverse social 
groups find their way into the process of the state, and the state itself is divided by 
interests between scales, among divisions, among informal groups, among others. 
Consequently, neoliberalization is a process of negotiation and conflicts, rather than a 
smooth transition to a state form that better represents class interest. The source of this 
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